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Abstract—We report on a user study that provides evidence
that spaced repetition and a specific mnemonic technique enable
users to successfully recall multiple strong passwords over time.
Remote research participants were asked to memorize 4 Person-
Action-Object (PAO) stories where they chose a famous person
from a drop-down list and were given machine-generated random
action-object pairs. Users were also shown a photo of a scene and
asked to imagine the PAO story taking place in the scene (e.g.,
Bill Gates—swallowing—bike on a beach). Subsequently, they
were asked to recall the action-object pairs when prompted with
the associated scene-person pairs following a spaced repetition
schedule over a period of 127+ days. While we evaluated several
spaced repetition schedules, the best results were obtained when
users initially returned after 12 hours and then in 1.5× increasing
intervals: 77% of the participants successfully recalled all 4
stories in 10 tests over a period of ≈ 158 days. Much of the
forgetting happened in the first test period (12 hours): 89%
of participants who remembered their stories during the first
test period successfully remembered them in every subsequent
round. These findings, coupled with recent results on naturally
rehearsing password schemes, suggest that 4 PAO stories could
be used to create usable and strong passwords for 14 sensitive
accounts following this spaced repetition schedule, possibly with
a few extra upfront rehearsals. In addition, we find statistically
significant evidence that with 8 tests over 64 days users who
were asked to memorize 4 PAO stories outperform users who
are given 4 random action-object pairs, but with 9 tests over 128
days the advantage is not significant. Furthermore, there is an
interference effect across multiple PAO stories: the recall rate of
100% (resp. 90%) for participants who were asked to memorize
1 PAO story (resp. 2 PAO stories) is significantly better than the
rate for participants who were asked to memorize 4 PAO stories.
These findings yield concrete advice for improving constructions
of password management schemes and future user studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are currently the dominant form of human au-
thentication over the Internet despite many attempts to replace
them [1]. A typical internet user has the complex task of creat-
ing and remembering passwords for many different accounts.
Users struggle with this task, adopting insecure password
practices [2]–[5] or frequently having to reset their passwords.
Yet research on human memory provides reason for optimism.
Specifically, spaced repetition—a memorization technique that
incorporates increasing intervals of time between subsequent
review of previously learned material—has been shown to be
effective in enabling recall in a wide variety of domains [6]–
[10]. Similarly, mnemonic techniques that provide multiple
semantic encodings of information (e.g., as stories and images)
also significantly help humans recall information [10], [11].
We report on a user study that provides evidence that spaced
repetition and mnemonics enable users to successfully recall
multiple strong passwords over time. The study is inspired by a
recent result on naturally rehearshing password schemes [12]
that rely on spaced repetition and a specific Person-Action-
Object (PAO) mnemonic technique to design a scheme to
create and maintain multiple strong passwords. As a core
component of the study, remote research participants were
asked to memorize 4 Person-Action-Object (PAO) stories
where they chose a famous person from a drop-down list
and were given machine-generated random action-object pairs.
Users were also shown a photo of a scene and asked to imagine
the PAO story taking place in the scene (e.g., Bill Gates—
swallowing—bike on a beach). Subsequently, they were asked
to recall the action-object pairs (e.g., swallowing—bike) when
prompted with the associated scene-person pairs (e.g., Bill
Gates—beach) following a spaced repetition schedule over a
period of 100+ days. We designed the study to seek answers
to the following questions:
• Do users who follow spaced repetition schedules suc-
cessfully recall multiple PAO stories and, if so, which
schedules work best?
• Does the PAO mnemonic technique improve recall over
random action-object pairs alone?
• Is there an interference effect when users are asked to
memorize multiple PAO stories?
We summarize our key findings and discuss their impli-
cations for password management below. First, while we
evaluated several spaced repetition schedules, the best results
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were obtained under the schedule in which users initially
returned after 12 hours and then in 1.5× increasing intervals:
76.6% of the participants successfully recalled all 4 stories in
10 tests over a period of ≈ 158 days. Much of the forgetting
happened in the first test period (the first 12 hours): 89%
of participants who remembered their stories during the first
test period successfully remembered them in every subsequent
round. This finding, coupled with recent results of Blocki et
al. [12], suggest that 4 PAO stories could be used to create and
maintain usable and strong passwords for up to 14 accounts
following this spaced repetition schedule, possibly with a
few extra upfront rehearsals. The finding that much of the
forgetting happens in the first test period robustly held in all
the spaced repetition schedules that we experimented with.
Another implication of this finding is that password expiration
policies [13] negatively impact usability by forcing users to
return to the highest rehearsal effort region of memorizing
a password. Furthermore, they are unnecessary for strong
passwords (see Section II).
Second, we find statistically significant evidence that ini-
tially with 8 tests over 64 days users who were asked to
memorize 4 PAO stories outperform users who are given 4
random action-object pairs, but with 9 tests over 128 days the
advantage is not significant. This finding is consistent with
the previous finding in that much of the forgetting happens
in the early rounds and in those rounds the PAO mnemonic
technique helps significantly with recall.
Third, we find a statistically significant interference effect
across multiple PAO stories. Specifically, the recall rate of
100% (resp. 90%) for participants who were asked to memo-
rize 1 PAO story (resp. 2 PAO stories) is significantly better
than the rate for participants who were asked to memorize 4
PAO stories. The interference effect is strong: it continues to be
statistically significant even if we only count a participant with
4 PAO stories as failing if they forgot their first (or first two)
action-object pair(s). This finding has several implications for
password management. Further studies are needed to discover
whether the interference effect is alleviated if users memorize
multiple PAO stories following a staggered schedule in which
they memorize 2 stories at a time. To accommodate this user
model, we also need new constructions for naturally rehearsing
password schemes in which passwords can be constructed
even when not all PAO stories are memorized upfront (see
Section VI for a concrete open problem). At the same time,
the perfect recall rate for 1 or 2 PAO stories suggests that they
could serve as a mechanism for strengthening existing pass-
words over time. This conclusion is similar to the conclusion
of a related study of Bonneau and Schechter [14] (although
there are significant differences between the two studies that
we discuss in Section V).
Organization. Section II briefly reviews the password man-
agement scheme of Blocki et al. [12], and the security of the
associated passwords consisting of random action-object pairs.
Section III presents the design of our user study. Section IV
describes the results of the study. Section V describes related
work. Finally, Section VI concludes with a discussion of the
implications of these results for password management and
suggestions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we show how a user can form multiple secure
passwords from a few random PAO stories by following the
Shared Cues password management scheme of Blocki et al.
[12]. We first analyze the security of passwords consisting
of randomly selected actions and objects in Section II-A. In
Section II-B we overview the Shared Cues password man-
agement scheme. In Section II-C we consider a variation of
the Shared Cues password management scheme which only
requires the user to memorize four PAO stories to form 14
strong passwords.
A. Security Against Offline Attacks
Any adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash
H (pw) of a user’s password pw can mount an automated
brute-force attack to crack the password by comparing H (pw)
with the cryptographic hashes of likely password guesses.
This attack is called an offline dictionary attack, and there
are many password crackers that an adversary could use [15].
Offline dictionary attacks against passwords are powerful and
commonplace [16]. Adversaries have been able to compromise
servers at large companies (e.g., Zappos, LinkedIn, Sony,
Gawker [17]–[22]) resulting in the release of millions of
cryptographic password hashes.
In expectation an adversary would need to pay NC (H) /2
to crack a password chosen uniformly at random from a
space of size N , where C (H) denotes the cost of evaluating
the cryptographic hash function H one time. In our study
each action is chosen uniformly at random from a list of 92
actions and each object is chosen from a list of 96 objects.
Thus, N = (8, 740)i for i randomly chosen action-object
pairs (approximately equivalent to a randomly chosen 4-digit
pin number when i = 1). Table I shows the expected cost
((8, 740)i C (H) /2) of an offline attack against a password
consisting of i randomly chosen action-object pairs. Symantec
reported that compromised passwords are sold for between $4
and $30 on the black market [23]. As long as C (H) ≥ $10−6 a
rational adversary would not bother trying to crack a password
consisting of two random action-object pairs. A password
consisting of three random action-object pairs would be strong
enough to protect higher value accounts.
Bonneau and Schechter used data on the Bitcoin mining
economy to estimate that C (H) ≈ $1.2×10−15 for the SHA-
256 hash function, and they estimate that iterated password
hashing1 can only increased this cost to C (H) ≈ $1.42×10−8
— unless we are willing to wait more than two seconds
to compute H during authentication. However, we note that
the value of C (H) could be increased without increasing au-
thentication time using other techniques (parallel computation,
memory hard functions). For example, if authentication were
performed on a GPU with 1, 024 cores and we were willing to
1Cryptographic password hash functions like SCRYPT or BCRYPT [24]
use similar ideas to increase C (H) .
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wait approximately two seconds for authentication we could
increase C (H) ≈ $2−16.07 ≈ $1.46 × 10−5 by developing a
function H whose computation can be divided easily2.
B. Shared Cues Password Management Scheme
Our user study is partially motivated by the Shared Cues
password management scheme of Blocki et al. [12]. In their
scheme the user memorizes random PAO stories, and forms
his passwords by appending the secret action(s) and object(s)
from different stories together.
Person-Action-Object Stories. A user who adopts the Shared
Cues password management scheme [12] first memorizes sev-
eral randomly generated Person-Action-Object (PAO) stories.
To memorize each PAO story the user would be shown four
images: a person, an action, an object and a scene. The user
is instructed to imagine the PAO story taking place inside the
scene. After the user has memorized a PAO story the computer
stores the images of the person and the scene, but discards the
images of the secret action and object.
A password is formed by concatenating the secret action(s)
and object(s) from several different PAO stories. During au-
thentication the images of the corresponding people/scenes
are used as a public cue to help the user remember his
secret stories. The public cues remind the user which secrets
are used to form each password (e.g., take the action from
the PAO story involving Bill Gates on the beach, append
the object from the PAO story involving Steve Jobs in the
woods,...). The rehearsal phase from our user study emulates
this authentication process.
We stress that the actions and the objects in each of these
PAO stories are selected uniformly at random by the computer
after the images of the person/scene have been fixed. If the user
selected the action and the object then he might pick actions
or objects that are correlated with the person or the scene
(e.g., users might favor objects like ‘apple’ for a person like
Steve Jobs). By having the computer select the story we ensure
that the secret actions and objects are not correlated with the
public cue for the password. Thus, an adversary who is able
to observe these public cues does not gain any advantage in
guessing the corresponding password.
Sharing Stories. Stories are shared across different accounts
to minimize the total number of stories that the user needs
to remember and, more importantly, to maximize the natural
rehearsal rate for each of the user’s PAO stories. Blocki
et al. [12] proposed using a particular combinatorial design
(definition 1) to balance security and usability. This combina-
torial design, which they called an (n, `, γ)-sharing set family,
ensures that no pair of passwords can share too many of the
same secret actions/objects. Thus, an adversary who has seen
one of the user’s passwords will not be able to guess any of
the user’s other passwords. More formally, let Si (resp. Sj)
denote the subset of secrets (actions/objects) used to form the
2One concrete way to accomplish this would be to set H(x) =
H1
(y∈{0,1}dH2 (x, y)), where H1 and H2 are also cryptographic hash
functions. Each of the 2d calls to H2 could be evaluated in parallel.
password pwi (resp. pwj) for account Ai (resp. Aj). Even if
the adversary sees pwj he still has to guess all of the secrets
in Si − (Si ∩ Sj) before he can obtain pwi. In an (n, `, γ)-
sharing set family we can ensure that the set Si − (Si ∩ Sj)
contains at least `− γ secrets.
Definition 1: We say that a set family S = {S1, ..., Sm}
is (n, `, γ)-sharing if (1) |⋃mi=1 Si| = n, (2)|Si| = ` for each
Si ∈ S, and (3) |Si ∩ Sj | ≤ γ for each pair Si 6= Sj ∈ S.
Here, n denotes the number of secrets (actions/objects)
that the user has to memorize and m denotes the number of
passwords that the user can form. Intuitively, we want to keep
n as small as possible to minimize memorization effort. Even
if the adversary learns the users password pwj for account Aj
then the password for account Si is still at least as strong as
a password containing `− γ secrets.
Blocki et al. [12] showed how a user could create m = 110
unique passwords from n = 43 PAO stories using a (43, 4, 1)-
sharing set family (in their scheme each password consisted
of four action-object pairs). Even if an adversary was able to
obtain two of the user’s passwords all of the user’s remaining
passwords would be at least as strong as a password containing
2 random action-object pairs — strong enough to resist offline
attacks3. Even if an adversary was able to obtain three of the
user’s passwords all of the user’s remaining passwords would
be strong enough to resist online attacks — each remaining
password contains at least one unknown action-object pair.
Usability Model. Blocki et al. [12] developed a usability
model to predict how much work a user would need to do to
remember all of his secrets. A central piece of their model was
based on an assumption about human memory that they called
the expanding rehearsal assumption. Loosely, this assumption
states that a person will be able to remember his secrets if
he follows a spaced repetition schedule like the ones tested in
this study.
C. Variants Considered in Our Study
We observe that 4 PAO stories is already enough to generate
14 moderately secure passwords in the Shared Cues framework
using a (8, 4, 2)-sharing set family of size m = 14. To see this
we observe that S = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 7, 8},
{1, 3, 5, 7}, {1, 3, 6, 8}, {1, 4, 5, 8}, {1, 4, 6, 7}, {2, 3, 5, 6},
{2, 3, 6, 7}, {2, 4, 5, 7}, {2, 4, 6, 8}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 7, 8},
{5, 6, 7, 8}} is an (8, 4, 2)-sharing set family. Each PAO story
that the user memorizes can be viewed as containing two
independent secrets (the action and the object). Thus, each
password will contain ` = 4 secrets (actions and/or objects).
The password pw1 for the first account A1 would be formed
by appending the actions and objects from the first two PAO
stories and the password pw14 for account A14 would be
formed by appending the actions and objects from the last
two PAO stories.
Security. Each password is strong enough to resist an offline
attack (see 3). Even if the adversary recovered one of the
3Assuming that the passwords are encrypted with a cryptographic hash
function H with C (H) ≥ $10−6 and that the adversary is not willing to
spend more than $30 cracking the password [23].
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# Action-Object Pairs in Password
C (H) One Two Three Four
$10−5 $4.4× 10−2 $390 $3.4× 106 $3.0× 1010
$10−6 $4.4× 10−3 $39 $3.4× 105 $3.0× 109
$10−7 $4.4× 10−4 $3.9 $3.4× 104 $3.0× 108
TABLE I: Expected Cost of an Offline Attack
passwords in a plaintext password breach all of the user’s
other passwords are strong enough to resist online attacks
because each password will contain at least two unknown
secrets (action(s) and/or object(s)).
Usability. The evaluation of usability of this construction can
be decomposed into two questions. First, can users robustly
recall 4 PAO stories while following a suitable spaced rep-
etition schedule? A central goal of our study is to answer
this question. Second, how many extra rehearsals (beyond
rehearsals from normal logins) does a user have to perform
in order to follow the spaced repetition schedule? We do not
attempt to answer this question in our study. However, we
provide a sense of this user effort in the discussion section
(see Section VI).
III. STUDY DESIGN
Our user study was conducted online using Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk framework, on a website at our institution. It was
approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Carnegie
Mellon University. After participants consented to participate
in the research study, we randomly assigned each participant to
a particular study condition. Members in a particular condition
were assigned a particular number of action-object pairs (either
1, 2, or 4), a particular memorization technique (mnemonic
or text), and a particular rehearsal schedule (e.g., 24hr×2,
12hr×1.5) as determined by the condition.
Participants were then asked to complete a memorization
phase. We randomly selected actions (e.g., swallowing) and
objects (e.g., bike) for each participant to memorize. Partic-
ipants in mnemonic conditions were also assigned pictures
or “scenes,” one for each action-object pair, and were given
specific instructions about how to memorize their words.
We paid participants $0.50 for completing the memorization
phase. Once participants completed the memorization phase
we asked them to return periodically to rehearse their words.
To encourage participants to return we paid participants $0.75
for each rehearsal, whether or not they were able to remember
the words. If a participant forgot an action-object pair, then
we reminded the participant of the actions and objects that
were assigned and asked that participant to complete the
memorization phase again.
We restricted our participant pool to those Mechanical Turk
workers who had an approval rate of 95% or better, had
completed at least 100 previous tasks, and were identified by
Amazon as living in the United States. 797 participants visited
our study website, and 578 completed the memorization phase
and initial rehearsal phase.
A. Recruitment
On the Mechanical Turk website, participants were
recruited with the following text:
Participate in a Carnegie Mellon University re-
search study on memory. You will be asked to
memorize and rehearse random words for a 50
cent payment. After you complete the memorization
phase, we will periodically ask you to return to
check if you still remember the words. If you forget
the words then we will remind you of the words and
ask you to complete the memorization phase again.
You will be paid 75 cents upon the completion of
each rehearsal.
Because this is a memory study we ask that
you do not write down the words that we ask you
to memorize. You will be paid for each completed
rehearsal phase — even if you forgot the words.
B. Memorization Phase
1) Mnemonic group: We first describe the memorization
phase for participants assigned to a mnemonic condition.
Participants in the mnemonic group were given the following
instructions:
This study is being conducted as part of a
Carnegie Mellon University research project. It is
important that you answer questions honestly and
completely. Please take a minute to read the follow-
ing instructions.
The goal of this study is to quantify the effects
of rehearsal and the use of mnemonic techniques on
long term memory retention. In this study you will
be asked to memorize and rehearse eight random
words (four actions and four objects). During the
first phase we will ask you to memorize the eight
random words — you will be paid $0.50 upon
completion of the memorization phase. After you
complete the memorization phase we will periodi-
cally ask you to return via email to check if you
still remember the words. If you forget the words,
we will remind you of the words and ask you to
complete the memorization phase again. You will be
paid $0.75 upon the completion of each rehearsal.
Important: Because this is a memory study we
ask that you do not write down the words we ask you
to memorize. You will be paid for each completed
rehearsal phase — even if you forgot the words.
You have been assigned to the mnemonic group,
which means that we give you specific instructions
about how to memorize the words. One of the
purposes of this study is to determine how effective
certain mnemonic techniques are during the memo-
rization task. We ask that you follow the directions
exactly — even if you would prefer to memorize the
words in a different way.
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Fig. 1: Memorization Step 1. Scene and Person.
After participants finished reading the instructions the mem-
orization phase proceeded as follows:
Step 1 Initially, participants were shown a photo of an assigned
scene. Participants were next asked to select a famous person
or character from a predefined list (e.g., Darth Vader) and were
shown a photograph of the famous person that they selected
— see Figure 1. Once selected, participants could not change
their person choices. After selecting a person, participants saw
a randomly selected action-object pair. See Appendix A for the
lists of people, actions and objects used in the study.
Step 2 As shown in Figure 2, we asked participants to imagine
a story in which the person they selected is performing the
action in the given scene (e.g., imagine Darth Vader bribing
the roach on the lily pad). We asked participants to type in
this story, with all words in the correct order (Person-Action-
Object).
Step 3 Participants were then required to select photographs
of the action and object, and type in the action and object
words two more times in separate fields.
We asked most participants to repeat Steps 1 through 3
four times using a new scene (e.g., a baseball field or a hotel
room underneath the sea), a new famous person/character and
a new action-object pair during each repetition. Thus, most
participants memorized a total of eight words (four actions
and four objects). After the memorization phase, we asked
participants to complete a rehearsal phase (See Figure 4)
before leaving the website.
2) Text group: We next describe the memorization phase
for participants assigned to a text condition. Participants in
the text group were given the same instructions as those in
the mnemonic group, with the exception of the last paragraph,
which begins “You have been assigned to the mnemonic
group. . . ” This paragraph is omitted for those in a text
condition. After participants finished reading the instructions,
the memorization phase proceeded as follows:
Step 1 As shown in Figure 3, we randomly selected an action-
object pair, and displayed these words to the participant.
Fig. 2: Memorization Steps 2–3. Darth Vader bribing a roach
on the lily pad.
Fig. 3: Memorization Steps 1–3 for Text group.
Step 2 We asked each participant to spend one minute mem-
orizing his words. We suggest that participants imagine a
person performing the action with the object. We asked each
participant to type in a story which includes the action and
the object in the correct order.
Step 3 Participants were then required to type in the action
and object words two more times in separate fields.
As with the mnemonic group, we asked most participants
to repeat Steps 1 through 3 four times, and asked participants
to complete a rehearsal phase.
C. Rehearsal Phase
Each participant was assigned a particular rehearsal sched-
ule. The particular times that we ask the participant to return
were given by the rehearsal schedule that participant was
assigned to use (see Table II). We e-mailed participants to
remind them to return for each rehearsal using the following
text:
Dear Carnegie Mellon study participant: Please
return to (url) to participate in the next part of the
memory study. If you do not return promptly upon
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Fig. 4: Rehearsal Phase. Darth Vader and the photo of the lily
pads on the Amazon River provide a cue to aid memory recall.
receiving this email, you might not be considered
for future phases of the study. You will receive a
$0.75 bonus payment for completing this task and it
should take less than five minutes.
Remember that you should not write down the
words that were assigned to you. You will be paid
for each completed rehearsal phase — even if you
forgot the words.
...
If, for any reason, you do not want to complete
the study, please reply to this email and let us know
why, so we can improve our protocol for future
studies.
Thank you!
The Carnegie Mellon University Study Team
We describe the rehearsal phase below:
1) Mnemonic group: Each participant was shown the scene
and the picture of the person that he chose while memorizing
his first story during the memorization phase. We then asked
each participant to recall the assigned action and object for
that story. As shown in Figure 4, actions and objects were
browsable and searchable to aid recall. If the participant was
correct then we moved on to the next story. If the participant
was incorrect then we asked the participant to try again. Each
participant was allowed three guesses per action-object pair.
After three incorrect guesses we asked the participant to repeat
the memorization phase with the same actions and objects, and
try the rehearsal phase again. Once the participant correctly
entered all assigned action-object pairs, the rehearsal phase
ended and participants were paid automatically.
2) Text group: Each participant from the text group was
simply asked to recall the actions and objects assigned during
the memorization phase. As with the mnemonic group, actions
and objects were browsable and searchable to aid recall. Scor-
ing and payment were handled the same as in the mnemonic
conditions.
D. Follow Up Survey
Some participants did not return to rehearse their stories
during the rehearsal phase. We cannot tell whether or not
these participants would have remembered their passwords if
they had returned. Instead we can only report the fraction of
participants who remembered their passwords among those
who returned for each rehearsal during the study. There are
several reasons why a participant may not have returned (e.g.,
too busy, did not get the follow up message in time, convinced
he or she would not remember the password). If participants
do not return because they are convinced that they would not
remember the password then this could be a source of bias
(i.e., we would be selecting participants who are confident that
they remember the story). Our hypothesis is that the primary
reason that participants do not return is because they are too
busy, because they did not get our follow up message in time,
or because they are not interested in interacting with us outside
of the initial Mechanical Turk task, and not because they
were convinced that they would not remember the story. In
order to test our hypothesis we sent a follow up survey to all
participants who did not return to complete a rehearsal phase.
Participants were paid 25 cents for completing this survey. The
survey is described below:
You are receiving this message because you
recently participated in a CUPS Memory Study
at CMU. A while ago you received an e-mail to
participate in a follow up test. We would like to ask
you to complete a quick survey to help us determine
why participants were not able to return to complete
this follow up study. The survey should take less
than a minute to complete, and you will be paid 25
cents for completing the survey. The survey consists
of one question. Which of the following reasons best
describes why you were unable to return to take the
follow up test?
A I no longer wished to participate in the study.
B I was too busy when I got the e-mail for the
follow up test.
C I did not see the e-mail for the follow up test
until it was too late.
D I was convinced that I would not be able to
remember the words/stories that I memorized
when I received the e-mail for the follow up
test.
E I generally do not participate in follow up
studies on mechanical turk.
It is possible that some participants will choose not to
participate in the follow up survey. However, in our case their
decision not to participate is valuable information which sup-
ports our hypothesis, i.e., they are not interested in interacting
with us outside of the initial Mechanical Turk task.
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E. Rehearsal Schedules
In our study each participant was randomly assigned to
follow one of the following rehearsal schedules 24hr×2,
24hr×2+2start, 30min×2 and 12hr×1.5. The specific rehearsal
times for each schedule can be found in Table II. We can
interpret a schedule 24hr×2 as follows: the length of the first
rehearsal interval (e.g., the time between initial visit and the
first rehearsal) is 24 hours and the length of the i + 1’th
rehearsal interval is twice the length of the i’th rehearsal in-
terval. If the participant was assigned to the 24hr×2 rehearsal
schedule then we would send that participant a reminder
to rehearse 1 day after the memorization phase and if that
participant returned to complete the first rehearsal phase then
we would send that participant another reminder to rehearse 2
days after the first rehearsal. The next reminder would come
four days later, etc. The final rehearsal would take place on
day 1 + 2 + ... + 32 + 64 = 127. In the 12hr×1.5 schedule
the length of the first rehearsal interval is 12 hours and after
that intervals grow by a factor of 1.5. The 24hr×2+2start and
30min×2 conditions are similar to the 24hr×2 schedule except
that participants are asked to do a few additional rehearsals on
day 1 — after this the rehearsal intervals are identical to the
24hr×2 schedule.
If a participant did not return to complete a particular
rehearsal round then they were not asked to participant in
subsequent rounds. We stress that this is the only reason why
participants were dropped from the study. A participant who
forgot one or more of his words during rehearsal i would be
reminded of his secret words and would still be invited to
participate in rehearsal i+ 1.
We use the following syntactic pattern to denote a
study condition: (Memorization Technique) (Rehearsal Sched-
ule) (Number of action-object pairs memorized). For memo-
rization technique we use m to denote the mnemonic groups
and t to denote the text group. Thus, a participant in the group
m 24hr×2 4 refers to a user who was asked to memorize four
actions and four objects using the mnemonic techniques we
suggested and to rehearse his person-action-object stories fol-
lowing the 24hr×2 rehearsal schedule from Table II. Because
most participants were asked to memorize four random action-
object pairs we typically drop the “ 4” from the end of these
conditions.
F. Online studies
The passwords in our study did not protect high-value
accounts, limiting ecological validity. In contrast to real-world,
high-value passwords, study participants would not suffer
consequences beyond a modest time cost if they forgot their
password, nor were they incentivized to keep their passwords
only in memory beyond our repeated requests that they do so.
We recruited participants using Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Using MTurk allows us to study a larger volume of participants
in a controlled setting than would otherwise be possible.
MTurk workers tend to be younger, more educated, and more
technical than the general population, but they represent a
significantly more diverse population than is typically used
in lab studies, which often rely on college-student partic-
ipants [25], [26]. Many researchers have found that well-
designed MTurk studies provide high-quality user data [27]–
[32]. Adar has criticized MTurk studies in general, although
our use of crowdsourcing to understand human behavior fits
his description of an appropriate use [33].
IV. RESULTS
In this section we present the results from our study. In
Section IV-A we overview the raw data from our study (e.g.,
how many participants returned for each rehearsal round?) and
some simple metrics (e.g., how many of these participants
remembered their action-object pairs?) In Section IV-B we
discuss the results of a survey we sent to participants that
did not return for a rehearsal phase. In Section IV-C we
briefly overview Cox regression — a tool for performing
survival analysis that we used to compare several of our study
conditions. In Section IV-D we use the data from our study to
evaluate and compare different study conditions.
A. Study Data
One of the primary challenges in analyzing the results
from our study is that some participants were dropped from
the study because they were unable to return for one of
their rehearsals in a timely manner. We do not know how
many of these participants would have been able to remember
their stories under ideal circumstances. We consider several
different ways to estimate the true survival rate in each
condition. Before we present these metrics we must introduce
some notation.
Notation: We use NumRemembered (C, i) to denote the
number of participants from study condition C who remem-
bered their secret action-object pair(s) during rehearsal i with
< 3 incorrect guesses per action-object pair, and we use
NumSurvived (C, i) to denote the number of participants
who also remembered their action-object pair(s) during every
prior rehearsal. We use NumReturned (C, i) to denote the
total number of participants who returned for rehearsal i and
we use NumSuccessfulReturned (C, i) to denote the total
number of participants who survived through rehearsal i − 1
and returned for rehearsal i. Finally, we use Time (C, i)
to denote the time of rehearsal i, as measured from the
initial memorization phase. Because the study condition C is
often clear from the context we will typically omit it in our
presentation.
Observe that NumSurvived(i)NumSuccessfulReturned(i) denotes the con-
ditional probability that a participant remembers his PAO
stories during rehearsal i given that s/he has survived through
rehearsal i − 1 and returned for rehearsal i. Figures 5a and
5b plot the conditional probability of survival for participants
in different study conditions. Table III shows how many
participants who had never failed before returned in each
rehearsal round as well as their conditional probability of
success with 95% confidence intervals.
We compare three different metrics to estimate the sur-
vival rate of participants in our study under ideal circum-
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Schedule Multiplier Base Rehearsal Intervals Rehearsal Days
24hr×2 ×2 1 Day 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127
12hr×1.5 ×1.5 0.5 days 0.5, 1.25, 2.4, 4, 6.5, 10,16,24,37,56 0.5, 1.75, 4.15, 8.15, 14.65, 24.65, 40.65,
64.65, 101.65, 157.65
24hr×2+2start ×2 1 Day 0.1 days, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 0.1, 0.6, 1.6, 3.6, 7.6, 15.6, 31.6, 63.6, 127.6
30min×2 ×2 30 min 0.5 hr, 1 hr, 2 hr, 4 hr, 8 hr, 1 day, 2, 4, 8,
16, 32, 64
0.5hr, 1.5hr, 3.5hr, 7.5hr, 15.5hr, 1.65 days,
3.65, 7.65, 15.65, 31.65, 63.65, 127.65
TABLE II: Rehearsal Schedules
Initial
NumSuccessfulReturned (i),
NumSurvived(i)/NumSuccessfulReturned (i),
95% confidence interval
Rehearsal i\
Condition i =
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
m 24hr×2+2start 80
51
94.1%
0.838,0.988
41
100%
0.914,1
38
100%
0.907,1
37
97.3%
0.858,0.999
36
100%
0.903,1
36
97.2%
0.855,0.999
34
97.1%
0.847,0.999
30
90%
0.735,0.978
25
68%
0.465,0.85
t 24hr×2+2start 100
71
88.7%
0.790,0.950
54
96.3%
0.873,0.995
51
100%
0.930,1
51
100%
0.930,1
51
94.1%
0.836,0.988
48
95.8%
0.857,0.995
44
88.6%
0.754,0.962
39
79.5%
0.635,0.907
39
86.2%
0.683,0.961
m 24hr×2 75
65
76.9%
0.648,0.845
45
93.3%
0.817,0.986
40
100%
0.912,1
39
97.4%
0.865,0.999
37
97.3%
0.858,0.999
32
96.9%
0.838,0.999
28
89.3%
0.718,0.977
N/A N/A
m 24hr×2+2start 2 81
50
100%
0.929,1
42
100%
0.916,1
42
100%
0.916,1
41
100%
0.914,1
38
100%
0.907,1
37
100%
0.905,1
36
100%
0.903,1
33
100%
0.894,1
30
90%
0.735,0.979
m 24hr×2+2start 1 86
64
100%
0.943,1
52
100%
0.932,1
49
100%
0.927,1
49
100%
0.927,1
47
100%
0.925,1
46
100%
0.923,1
45
100%
0.922,1
44
100%
0.920,1
43
100%
0.918,1
m 12hr×1.5 83
72
86.1%
0.759,0.931
53
98.1%
0.899,1.000
51
100%
0.930,1
51
100%
0.930,1
49
100%
0.927,1
46
97.8%
0.885,0.999
43
100%
0.918,1
42
97.6%
0.874,0.999
42
94.9%
0.827,0.994
m 30min×2 73
40
95%
0.831,0.994
27
100%
0.872,1
26
100%
0.868,1
24
100%
0.858,1
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
Rehearsal i\
Condition i = 10 i = 11 i = 12
m 30min×2
21
95.2%
0.762,0.999
20
90%
0.683,0.988
17
93.3%
0.681,0.998
m 12hr×1.5
36
100%
0.903,1
N/A N/A
TABLE III: NumSurvived(i)/NumSuccessfulReturned(i) with 95% binomial confidence intervals. m = “mnemonic,”
t =“text”
stances (e.g., if all of our participants were always able to
return to rehearse in a timely manner). Our first estimate is
EstimatedSurvival (i) =
i∏
j=1
NumSurvived (j)
NumSuccessfulReturned(j)
.
We plot this value in Figures 7.
Our second estimate, shown in Figure 8, is quite simple:
ObservedSurvival (i) =
NumSurvived (i)
NumReturned (i)
.
Our first estimate could be biased if participants are less
likely to return for future rehearsals whenever they think they
might forget their words. Our second estimate could be biased
if participants were less likely to return for future rehearsal
rounds after previous failures. However, we did not observe
any obvious correlation between prior failure and the return
rate. Sometimes the return rate was higher for participants who
had failed earlier than for participants who had never failed
and sometimes the return rate was lower. Furthermore, in our
survey of participants who did not return in time for a rehearsal
round no one self-reported that they did not return because
they were not confident that they would be able to remember
(see Section IV-B). Both methods consistently yielded close
estimates.
We also consider a pessimistic estimate of the survival rate
(see Figure 9) PessimisticSurvivalEstimate (i) =
NumSurvived (i)
NumSuccessfulReturned (i) +NumFailed (i)
.
Here, NumFailed (i) counts the number of participants who
failed to remember at least one of his action-object pairs
with < 3 guesses during any rehearsal j ≤ i — even if
that participant did not return for later rehearsal rounds. This
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Initial
Returned (i),
NumSurvived(i)/NumReturned(i),
95% confidence interval
Rehearsal i\
Condition i=0 7 8 9 10
m 24hr×2+2start 80
38
86.8%
0.719,0.956
34
79.4%
0.621,0.913
31
54.8%
0.360,0.727
N/A
t 24hr×2+2start 100
56
69.6%
0.559,0.812
55
56.4%
0.423,0.697
50
50%
0.355,0.645
N/A
m 24hr×2 75
39
64.1%
0.472,0.788
N/A N/A N/A
m 24hr×2+2start 2 81
36
100%
0.903,1
33
100%
0.894,1
30
90%
0.735,0.979
N/A
m 24hr×2+2start 1 86
45
100%
0.922,1
44
100%
0.920,1
43
100%
0.918,1
N/A
m 12hr×1.5 83
53
81.1%
0.680,0.906
51
80.4%
0.669,0.902
49
77.6%
0.634,0.882
44
81.8%
0.673,0.918
m 30min×2 73
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
22
100%
0.846,1
21
95.2%
0.762,0.999
Rehearsal i\
Condition i = 11 i = 12
m 30min×2
21
85.7%
0.637,0.970
17
82.4%
0.566,0.962
TABLE IV: NumSurvived(i)/NumReturned(i) with
95% binomial confidence intervals. m = “mnemonic,”
t =“text”
estimate is most likely overly pessimistic because it includes
every participant who failed early on during the study before
dropping out, but it excludes every participant who dropped
out without failing. For example, a participant who succeeded
through rehearsal 5 but could not return for rehearsal 6 would
not be included in the estimate for i ≥ 6. However, if our
participant had failed during round 2 before not returning for
rehearsal 3 then s/he would still be included in the estimate.
B. Survey Results
We surveyed 61 participants who did not return to complete
their first rehearsal to ask them why they were not able to
return. The results from our survey are presented in Figure 10.
The results from our survey strongly support our hypothesis
that the primary reason that participants do not return is
because they were too busy, because they did not get our
follow up message in time, or because they were not interested
in interacting with us outside of the initial Mechanical Turk
task, and not because they were convinced that they would not
remember the story — no participant indicated that they did
not return because they thought that they would not be able
to remember the action-object pairs that they memorized.
Fun: We had several participants e-mail us to tell us how
much fun they were having memorizing person-action-object
stories. The results from our survey are also consistent with
the hypothesis that memorizing person-action-object stories is
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Fig. 6: NumRemembered (i) /NumReturned (i) vs
Time (i)
fun (e.g., no participants said that they no longer wished to
participate in the study).
C. Statistical methods
We used Cox regression to perform survival analysis, and
compare different study conditions. Survival analysis relates
the time that passes before a failure event (e.g., a user forgets
one of his action-object pairs during a rehearsal) to covariates
(e.g., mnemonic/text, rehearsal schedule, number of words
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Fig. 8: ObservedSurvival (i) vs Time (i)
memorized) that may be associated with this quantity of time.
Cox regression is an appropriate tool for our study because
it can deal with participants who dropped out of the study
before they failed (e.g., participants who did not return for a
rehearsal in a timely manner).
To run Cox regression we need to have the following data
for each participant: whether or not they failed, the time of
failure for participants who did fail and the time a participant
dropped out of the study for participants who were dropped
before their first failure. The output of Cox regression is a
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Fig. 10: Survey Results
set of regression coefficients β1, . . . , βk, which tell us how
different study conditions affect the survival rate compared to
a baseline condition4. For example, suppose that our base-
line condition was the t 24hr×2+2start condition then the
regression coefficient βm would tell us how the survival rate
in the m 24hr×2+2start condition compared to the survival
rate in the t 24hr×2+2start condition. If exp (βm) < 1 (resp.
exp ((βm)) > 1) then participants in the mnemonic condition
are less likely (resp. more likely) to fail at any given time than
participants in the baseline text condition.
D. Findings
1) Reliable Recall of Multiple Passwords: We found
that 82% of participants in the m 12hr×1.5 condition who
were always able to return were able to remember all four
of their secret action-object pairs during all ten of their
rehearsal rounds over a time period of 158 days. This value
(NumSurvived (10) /NumReturned (10) = 0.818)
closely matches our estimated survival rate
EstimatedSurival (10) = 0.765. As explained before,
eight secrets (four actions and four objects) could be used to
form 14 different passwords using the Shared Cues password
management scheme [12]. As we can see from Table III,
most of the participants who did not survive forgot their
action-object pairs during the first rehearsal.
2) Reliable Recall of a Single Password: 100% of par-
ticipants who were asked to memorize one or two PAO
stories (e.g., one password) were able to remember all of
their secret action-object pairs during their first eight re-
hearsals over a time period of 63.6 days. 100% of partici-
pants in the m 24hr×2+2start 1 condition also remembered
their PAO story during the final rehearsal on day 128. The
95% confidence interval for the fraction of participants in
4We use the proportional hazard model to compare the risk of failure for
participants in different study conditions. In particular, given a baseline study
condition we let λ0(t) denote the underlying hazard function — a function
describing the risk that a participant fails to remember his action-object
pairs at time t. Given explanatory variables x1, . . . , xp we use the function
λ (t x1, . . . , xp) = λ0 (t) exp (β1x1 + . . .+ βpxp), to compare the risk
for participants in different study conditions and we use Cox regression to
compute the regression coefficients β1, . . . , βp for each explanatory variable.
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Condition xi βi exp (βi) exp (−βi)
95% Confidence
Interval for exp (βi)
Lower Upper
m 30min×2 -0.8323 0.4351 2.299 0.1760 1.0752
m 24hr×2+2start -0.2610 0.7703 1.298 0.4108 1.442
m 12hr×1.5 -0.8677 0.4199 2.381 0.2164 0.8147 *
n = 228, number of failure events k = 56.
* indicates exp (βi) is significantly different from 1 at the α = 0.05 level.
TABLE V: Cox regression with baseline: m 24hr×2
the m 24hr×2+2start 1 (resp. m 24hr×2+2start 2) condition
who always remember their action-object pairs over 128 days
is [0.918, 1] (resp. [0.673, 0.918]).
3) Effect of Rehearsal: The m 12hr×1.5 condition had the
best survival rate. We used Cox regression to compare the
survival rate for participants in the m 24hr×2, m 12hr×1.5,
m 24hr×2+2start, and m 30min×2 study conditions, using
the m 24hr×2 condition as our baseline. Our results are
shown in Table V. For all three conditions m 12hr×1.5,
m 24hr×2+2start, and m 30min×2 we have exp (βi) < 1
meaning that our model predicts that participants in the
baseline condition (m 24hr×2) were less likely to survive
at any given point in time. However, the evidence for the
hypothesis exp (βi) < 1 was only statistically significant (at
the α = 0.05 level) for the m 12hr×1.5 conditions because
the confidence interval for exp (βi) does not contain the value
1. A larger study would need to be done to establish statistical
significance for the 24hr×2+2start or 30min×2 conditions5.
We contrast the results of Cox regression, which oper-
ates over the full duration of our study, with simple t-
tests performed on estimated survival rates between con-
ditions at a specific point in time, typically 64 days af-
ter memorization. We do this to examine estimated per-
formance after passwords have been used for an extended
period of time. In particular, we used a one-tailed t-tests
for the hypotheses that ObservedSurvival (C1, i1) >
ObservedSurvival (C2, i2) for C1 = m 24hr×2 and C2 ∈
{m 12hr×1.5, m 30min×2, m 24hr×2+2start }. We adjusted
the values of i1 and i2 to compare the survival rates over
similar time periods for participants who followed different
rehearsal schedules. In particular, every rehearsal schedule
had one rehearsal near day 64 (e.g., the sixth rehearsal in
the 24hr×2 schedule was on day 63 and the eighth rehearsal
for the 12hr×1.5 schedule was on day 64.65). Table VIII
shows these results. While the survival rates were lowest in
the m 24hr×2 condition the t-test results were not statistically
significant at the α = 0.05 level.
4) Mnemonic vs Text Conditions: We found that partici-
pants who used the PAO mnemonic technique significantly
outperform users who didn’t in recalling their action-object
pairs in the short term. In particular, we used a one-tailed t-
test and tested the hypothesis ObservedSurvival (C1, i1) >
ObservedSurvival (C2, i2) for C1 = m 24hr×2+2start and
5Because the 30min×2 condition had many rehearsals on day 1 our time
window for participants to return for each of these rehearsals was more narrow
than in other conditions. As a result many participants in this condition were
dropped after day 1 because they were not able to return in a timely manner.
Condition xi βi exp (βi) exp (−βi)
95% Confidence
Interval for exp (βi)
Lower Upper
t 24hr×2+2start 0.4183 1.519 0.6582 0.843 2.738
n = 122, number of failure events k = 49.
TABLE VI: Baseline: m 24hr×2+2start
Condition xi βi exp (βi) exp (−βi)
95% Confidence
Interval for exp (βi)
Lower Upper
t 24hr×2+2start 1.04 2.829 0.3434 1.287 6.219 *
n = 122, number of failure events k = 37.
* indicates exp (βi) is significantly different from 1 at the α = 0.05 level.
TABLE VII: Baseline: m 24hr×2+2start
C2 = t 24hr×2+2start. We compared our conditions at two
points in time: 63.6 days after memorization (i1 = i2 = 8)
and after the final rehearsal 127.6 days after memorization
(i1 = i2 = 9). Table VIII shows these results.
The evidence that participants in m 24hr×2+2start perform
better than participants in t 24hr×2+2start for the first 63.6
days after memorization is statistically significant (p = 0.010).
However, after the final rehearsal (i1 = i2 = 9) the evi-
dence for our hypothesis is no longer statistically significant.
Surprisingly, during the last rehearsal round on day 127.6,
participants in the t 24hr×2+2start condition were more likely
to remember their action-object pairs than participants in the
m 24hr×2+2start condition. We also used Cox regression
to compare the survival rates for the t 24hr×2+2start and
m 24hr×2+2start conditions using the m 24hr×2+2start con-
dition as a baseline. Our results are shown in Table VI. We
have exp (βi) > 1 for the t 24hr×2+2start condition, which
indicates that participants did benefit from adopting mnemonic
techniques to memorize their action-object pairs. However,
the hypothesis exp (β1) > 1 (e.g., the survival rate is worse
in the text condition) does not reach the level of statistical
significance at the α = 0.05 level. Table VII shows the results
of Cox regression if we only include data from the first eight
rehearsal rounds (through day 63.6). In this case the hypothesis
exp (βi) > 1 is statistically significant.
5) Effect of Interference: We found that there is an in-
terference effect. Participants performed better when mem-
orizing one or two PAO stories. We used Cox regres-
sion with the m 24hr×2+2start 4 condition as a baseline
and found statistically significant evidence (α < 0.01)
that the survival rate was better in the m 24hr×2+2start 2
condition (exp (βi) = 6.905). Because there were
no failure events in the m 24hr×2+2start 1 condition
Cox regression did not converge for this condition —
βi approaches −∞. We also used a one-tailed t-test
to test the hypothesis ObservedSurvival (C1, i1) >
ObservedSurvival (C2, i2) for the conditions C1 ∈
{m 24hr×2+2start 1, m 24hr×2+2start 2} and C2 =
m 24hr×2+2start 4. We tested the hypothesis 127.6 days after
memorization (e.g., i1 = i2 = 9). The results are shown in
Table VIII. The evidence for both hypotheses was statistically
significant. In fact, we can even confirm much stronger ver-
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Condition C1 i1 (Day) Condition C2 i2 (Day) p-value
m 24hr×2+2start 8 (63.6) t 24hr×2+2start 8 (63.6) 0.010 *
m 24hr×2+2start 9 (127.6) t 24hr×2+2start 9 (127.6) 0.338
m 24hr×2+2start 1 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 1. 8 (63.6) 0.042 *
m 24hr×2+2start 2 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 2. 8 (63.6) 0.006 *
m 24hr×2+2start 1 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 3. 8 (63.6) 0.0011 *
m 24hr×2+2start 2 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 3. 8 (63.6) 0.0011 *
m 24hr×2+2start 1 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemarks 1 and 3. 8 (63.6) 0.03 *
m 24hr×2+2start 2 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemarks 2 and 3. 8 (63.6) 0.046 *
m 24hr×2+2start 1 9 (127.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 1. 9 (127.6) 0.011 *
m 24hr×2+2start 2 9 (127.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemark 2. 9 (127.6) 0.017 *
m 24hr×2+2start 1 9 (127.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemarks 1 and 3. 9 (127.6) 0.012 *
m 24hr×2+2start 2 9 (127.6) m 24hr×2+2startRemarks 2 and 3. 9 (127.6) 0.331
m 24hr×2+2start 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2 6 (63) 0.287
m 30min×2 8 (63.6) m 24hr×2 6 (63) 0.146
m 12hr×1.5 8 (64.65) m 24hr×2 6 (63) 0.228
Remark 1. Count participant as surviving if s/he always remembered the
first action-object pair.
Remark 2. Count participant as surviving if s/he always remembered the
first two action-object pairs.
Remark 3. If a participant dropped and never failed count them as surviving.
* indicates statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level.
TABLE VIII: One-Tailed t-tests for Hypotheses:
ObservedSurvival (C1, i1) >
ObservedSurvival (C2, i2)
sions of these hypotheses. For example, the survival rate in
the m 24hr×2+2start 1 condition is greater than the survival
rate in the m 24hr×2+2start 4 even if we only count failures
on the first action-object pair and even if we treat every
participant P from the m 24hr×2+2start 4 condition who
dropped without failing as if they had survived.
V. RELATED WORK
A. Spaced Repetition
Pimsleur [9] proposed a rehearsal schedule to help people
memorize unfamiliar vocabulary words. He suggested rehears-
ing after 5 seconds, 25 seconds, 2 minutes, 10 minutes, 5
hours, 1 day, 5 days, 20 days, etc. Pimsleur based his rec-
ommendations on previous empirical studies [34, pp. 726 ff].
Blocki et al. [12] developed a usability model for password
management schemes based on an assumption they called
the expanding rehearsal assumptions. Loosely, this assumption
states that a user will be able to remember a secret by
following a rehearsal schedule similar to the one proposed
by Pimsleur. The application SuperMemo [8] uses a similar
rehearsal schedule to help users remember flashcards. Wozniak
and Gorzelanczyk conducted an empirical study to test these
rehearsal schedules [7]. In their study undergraduate students
were asked to memorize and rehearse vocabulary words for
a foreign language by following a rehearsal schedule very
similar to the expanding rehearsal schedule. Wozniak and
Gorzelanczyk tracked each students performance with each
particular vocabulary word and used that information to es-
timate how difficult each word was. If a word was deemed
‘difficult’ then the length of the time interval before the
next rehearsal would only increase by a small multiplicative
constant (e.g., 1.5) and if the word was judged to be ‘easy’
then this time interval would increase by a larger multiplicative
constant (e.g., 4).
We stress two key differences in our study: First, because
we are asking the user to memorize secrets that will be
used to form passwords our rehearsal schedule needs to
be conservative enough that our user will consistently be
able to remember his secrets during each rehearsal. In other
studies the information participants were asked to memorize
(e.g., vocabulary words) was not secret so a participant
could simply look up the correct answer whenever they
forgot the correct answer during a rehearsal. By contrast,
in the password setting a recovery mechanism may not
always be available — users are advised against writing
down passwords and organizations have been held liable for
damages when they do not properly encrypt their passwords
[35]. Second, in our study we ask participants to memorize
secrets by following the Person-Action-Object mnemonic
techniques. Because these secrets may be easier or harder
to memorize than other information like vocabulary words
the ideal rehearsal schedule should be tailored to particular
mnemonic techniques adopted by the user. Previous studies
have demonstrated that cued recall is easier than pure recall
(see for example [10]) and that we have a large capacity for
visual memories [11]. However, we are not aware of any
prior studies which compare cued recall and pure recall when
participants are following a rehearsal schedule similar to the
one suggested by the expanding rehearsal assumption.
B. Spaced Repetition – Applications to Passwords
a) Password Management Schemes: While there are
many articles, books, papers and even comics about selecting
strong individual passwords [36]–[43], there has been little
work on password management schemes—systematic strate-
gies to help users create and remember multiple passwords—
that are both usable and secure. Bonneau et al. [1] eval-
uated several alternatives to text passwords (e.g., graphical
passwords, password management software, single-sign-on,
federated authentication) finding that, while each alternative
had its advantages, none of the alternatives were strictly better
than text passwords. Florencio et al. [44] argued that any
usable password management scheme6 cannot require users
to memorize unique random passwords. They suggested that
users adopt a tiered password management scheme with a
unique password for high, medium and low security accounts.
Blocki et al. [12] recently proposed designing password man-
agement schemes that maximized the natural rehearsal rate for
each of the secrets that the user had to memorize subject to
minimum security constraints. Our study is heavily motivated
by their work, which we already described in Section II.
6They use the term “password portfolios.”
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b) Slowly Expanding Password Strength: Bonneau and
Schechter conducted a user study in which participants were
encouraged to slowly memorize a strong 56 bit password using
spaced repetition [14]. Each time a participant returned to
complete a distractor task he was asked to login by entering his
password. During the first login the participant was shown four
additional random characters and asked to type them in after
his password. To encourage participants to memorize these
four characters they would intentionally wait a few seconds
before displaying them to the user the next time he was asked
to login to complete a distractor task. Once a participant was
able to login several times in a row (without waiting for
the characters to be displayed) they would encourage that
participant to memorize four additional random characters in
the same way. They found that 88% of participants were able
to recall their entire password without any prompting three
days after the study was completed.
There are several key difference between their study and
ours: First, in our study participants were asked to memorize
their entire password at the start of the study. By contrast,
Bonneau and Schechter encouraged participants to slowly
memorize their passwords. Second, Bonneau and Schechter
did not tell participants that their goal was to slowly memorize
a strong 56 bit password — users were led to believe that the
distractor task was the purpose of the study. By contrast, in
our study we explicitly told participants that their goal was to
remember their words (without writing them down). Finally,
participants in our study were given fewer chances to rehearse
their passwords and were asked to remember their passwords
over a longer duration of time (4 months vs 2 weeks). Bonneau
and Schechter asked participants to login 90 times over a two
week period. In our study participants were asked to rehearse
at most 12 times over a period of 127+ days. We believe
that the results of our study could be used to help improve the
password strengthening mechanism of Bonneau and Schechter
— see discussion in Section VI.
C. System Assigned Passwords.
Empirical studies have shown that many user-selected pass-
words are easily guessable [5]. A user study conducted by
Shay et al. [45] compared several different methods of gener-
ating system assigned passwords for users to memorize (e.g.,
three to four random words, 5 or 6 random characters). They
found that users had difficulty remembering system assigned
passwords 48–120 hours after they had memorized it. In fact,
users had more difficulty when asked to memorize three to four
random words from a small dictionary than when they were
asked to remember 5 to 6 random characters. Participants in
their study were not asked to follow any particular mnemonic
techniques, and were not asked to follow a rehearsal schedule.
D. Password Composition Policies
Another line of work on passwords has focused on compo-
sition policies (policies which restrict the space passwords that
users can choose) [39], [46]–[48]. These policies may nega-
tively effect usability (e.g., users report that their passwords are
more difficult to remember [39], [46]) and also have adverse
security effects (e.g., users are more likely to write down their
passwords [46], [48], some restrictive composition policies can
actually result in a weaker password distribution [46], [47]).
VI. DISCUSSION
Password Expiration Policies: Following NIST guide-
lines [13] many organizations require users to change their
passwords after certain period of time (e.g., thirty days).
The desired behavior is for users to select a random new
password that is uncorrelated with their previous passwords.
We contend that these policies adversely affect usability and
security. Memorizing a new password requires effort and users
are typically only willing to invest a limited amount time and
energy memorizing new passwords. Our experiments indicate
that most of the effort to memorize and rehearse a password
is spent in the first week after the new password is chosen. By
forcing users to reset their password frequently an organization
forces its users to remain within the most difficult rehearsal
region. There is strong empirical evidence that users respond
to password expiration policies by selecting weak passwords
and/or selecting new passwords that are highly correlated
with one of their old passwords (e.g., old password+i for
i = 1, 2, . . .) effectively canceling out any security gains
[49]. We contend that a more productive policy would ask
participants to slowly strengthen their passwords over time
using spaced repetition (see discussion below).
Strengthening Passwords Over Time: Our results suggest
that the password strengthening mechanism of Bonneau and
Schechter [14] could be improved by adopting the PAO
story mnemonic used in our study and by using a rehearsal
schedule like 24hr×2+2start to help predict when a user has
memorized his new secret. Recall that in their mechanism a
user authenticates by typing in his old password and then by
typing a random character or word that is displayed next to
the password box. To encourage participants to memorize this
secret character/word, the user will not be shown the random
character/word for several seconds, allowing a user who has
memorized the secret to authenticate faster than one who has
not. At some point the mechanism will predict that the user
has memorized his new secret. At this point this secret is
permanently appended to the user’s password so that the user
must remember this secret to authenticate — he can no longer
wait for the character/word to be displayed.
We remark that, instead of requiring the user to memorize
a new random character/word to append to his password, it
may be easier for the user to memorize a random action-
object pair using the PAO mnemonic techniques from this
study. Participants in the mnemonic 24hr×2+2start 1 con-
dition remembered their secret action-object pairs perfectly
through 128 days with only 9 rehearsals. We also remark
that the 24hr×2+2start rehearsal schedule could provide a
reasonable basis for predicting when a user has memorized his
new action-object pair. In particular, a rehearsal schedule could
help us predict how long the user will be able to remember
his new action-object pairs without rehearsing again. If it is
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safe to assume that the user will return to authenticate before
this point then we would argue that it is safe to predict that
the user has memorized his secret action-object pair.
Another interesting observation from our study was that
participants in the m 24hr×2 4 condition who remembered
their action-object pairs during the first two rehearsal on days
1 and 3 were actually more likely to survive through rehearsal
6 (on day 63) than participants in the m 24hr×2+2start 4
condition who remembered their action-object pairs through
rehearsal 4 (on day 3.6) were to survive through the corre-
sponding rehearsal 8 (on day 63.6) — though this result was
not significant at the p = 0.05 level. We hypothesize that
a user’s ability to remember a particular set of action-object
pairs after a challenging rehearsal interval (e.g., only 77% of
participants in the m 24hr×2 4 condition who returned for
the first rehearsal on day 1 remembered their action-object
stories) is better indicator of that user’s future success for
those particular action-object pairs than performance on less
challenging rehearsal intervals. This hypothesis could also help
us to predict when a user has memorized a new action-object
pair. However, more studies are necessary to properly test this
hypothesis.
Mitigating Initial Forgetting: We found that much of the
forgetting in our study occurred during the first test period.
This finding leads us to suggest three mechanisms to help
ensure that users will remember their action-object pairs in
the Shared Cues password management scheme: 1) Start with
a shorter initial time gap between the memorization phase and
the first rehearsal (e.g., 3 hours or 6 hours). 2) Instruct the user
to wait 12 hours after he has memorized the PAO stories before
using the secret action-object pairs to form passwords. If the
user can still remember his PAO stories after 12 hours then
he can go ahead and use those stories to create passwords.
3) Implement a temporary recovery mechanism which allows
a user who can remember one or two of his action-object
pairs to recover his other action-object pairs during the first 24
hours (e.g., 98.6% of participants in the m 12hr×1.5 condition
remembered their first action-object pair after 12 hours).
Natural Rehearsals: The usability model of Blocki et
al. [12] was based on an assumption about human memory.
Formally, their expanding rehearsal assumption says that a
user will continue to remember a secret s if he rehearses it at
least once during each of the time intervals [t0, t1) , [t1, t2) , . . .
where t0 = 0 and the length of the i’th interval is ti+1− ti =
bσis. Here, σs > 1 is a constant which may depend on
the strength of the mnemonic techniques used to memorize
the secret s, and b is a base unit of time. Observe that the
length of these rehearsal intervals grows exponentially with
the number of prior rehearsals (i). Our user study provides
evidence that users can remember 4 PAO stories following the
12hr×1.5 rehearsal schedule (e.g., b = 12 hours, σs = 1.5).
If the user needs to recall the secret s in the course of
a normal login during the time interval [ti, ti+1) then we
say that this rehearsal requirement was satisfied naturally.
If the user does not rehearse s naturally during the interval
[ti, ti+1) then he would need to be reminded to do an extra
Number of Accounts Visited
User Daily Weekly Monthly E[XR∞] E[XR∞ −XR1.75]
Active 5 5 4 3.29 0.01
Typical 2 8 4 7.81 0.14
Infrequent 0 2 12 30.41 7.41
TABLE IX: E[XR∞] — Expected number of extra rehearsals
to remember 14 passwords with 4 PAO stories with b = 0.5
days and σs = 1.5
rehearsal to ensure that he does not forget s. Blocki et al.
[12] suggested that we quantify the usability of a password
management scheme by predicting how many extra rehearsals
(XR∞) the user would need to perform over his lifetime to
remember all of his password related secrets. The value on
XR∞ will depend on how frequently the user logs into each
of his accounts (in additions to the parameters b and σ).
We previously observed that a user could form 14 passwords
from 4 PAO stories by adopting the Shared Cues scheme of
Blocki et al. [12]. Following Blocki et al. [12] we provide a
sense of the extra rehearsal effort necessary to remember all
four PAO stories. Table IX predicts how many extra rehearsals
(XR∞) the user would need to do over his lifetime to ensure
that he remembers all 4 of his PAO stories in expectation.
We used the parameters b = 12 hours and σs = 1.5 because
most users in our study were able to remember 4 PAO stories
by following the 12hr×1.5 rehearsal schedule. To make these
predictions we also assume that we know how frequently the
user visits each of his 14 accounts on average (e.g., daily,
weekly, monthly) and that the user’s visitation schedule is
well-modeled by a Poisson arrival process. We consider three
types of user profiles (Active, Typical and Infrequent).
The predictions in Table IX indicate that Active and Typ-
ical users could maintain 14 secure passwords with minimal
rehearsal effort. Table IX also predicts how many extra re-
hearsals the user would need to do after 1.75 days (the column
labeled E[XR∞] - E[XR1.75]). We observe that most of the
extra rehearsal effort is concentrated in first few days. After
1.75 days our Active and Typical users would most likely not
need to do any extra rehearsals over his lifetime to remember
all 4 PAO stories.
Mitigating the Interference Effect: One potential down-
side of the Shared Cues password management scheme [12] is
that the more secure versions of the scheme may require users
to memorize multiple stories at once. For example, Blocki et
al. [12] suggested that users memorize 43 stories to create 110
unique passwords with a (43, 4, 1)-sharing set family. While
this scheme provides very strong security guarantees (e.g.,
an adversary who has already seen one or two of the user’s
passwords could not break any of the user’s other passwords
even in an offline attack), the user would need to memorize at
least 36 of these stories just to form the first 9 passwords. We
observed an interference effect in our study suggesting that
users would find it difficult to memorize so many stories at
once. It is likely that the interference effect is, at least partially,
due to user fatigue (e.g., participants who memorized four
PAO stories had less mental energy to expend memorizing
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each action-object pair than participants who only memorized
one or two PAO stories). One potential way to mitigate the
interference effect would be have user’s follow a staggered
schedule in which they memorize two new PAO stories at
a time. Further studies are needed to test this hypothesis.
Another important research problem is to construct (n, `, γ)-
sharing set families that expand gracefully so that the user
does not need to memorize too many stories at the same time
(e.g., for every t we seek to minimize the number of action-
object pairs that a user would need to memorize to form the
first t passwords).
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APPENDIX
A. List of People, Actions and Objects from the User Study
Here are a list of the people, actions and objects we used
in the study. The lists contain 92 actions and 96 objects
respectively.
People: Ben Afleck, Beyonce, Joe Biden, Kobe Bryant,
George W Bush, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Albert Einstein,
Jimmy Fallon, Pope Francis, Frodo, Gandalf, Bill Gates, Adolf
Hitler, Lebron James, Steve Jobs, Angelina Jolie, Michael
Jordan, Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama, Rand Paul, Ron Paul,
Michael Phelps, Brad Pitt, Bart Simpson, Homer Simpson,
Luke Skywalker, Justin Timberlake, Kim Jong Un, Darth
Vader, Oprah Winfrey, Tiger Woods, Jay Z, Mark Zuckerberg
Actions: aiming, aligning, batting, bowing, bribing, bury-
ing, canning, chipping, choking, climbing, coating, combing,
concealing, cooking, copying, destroying, dodging, drying,
dueling, egging, elbowing, fanning, firing, fishing, flying, fol-
lowing, fuming, giving, gluing, gnawing, high fiving, howling,
hunting, inhaling, judging, juicing, jumping, kicking, kiss-
ing, knifing, lassoing, leashing, muddying, miming, marrying,
mauling, mashing, mugging, moving, mopping, mowing, nip-
ping, nosing, numbing, oiling, paddling, plowing, popping,
puking, pulling, punching, racing, raking, reaching, reeling,
riding, rolling, rowing, saving, searing, seizing, sheering, shin-
ing, signing, sipping, smelling, stewing, stretching, sucking,
swallowing, swimming, taping, tasting, tattooing, tazing, tug-
ging, voting, waking, waving, weeping, welding
Objects: ammo, ant, apple, arrow, beehive, bike, boa, boar,
bomb, bunny, bus, bush, cab, cake, canoe, cat, chain, chainsaw,
cheese, cheetah, chili, chime, coffee, couch, cow, daisy, dime,
dish, ditch, dove, duck, fish, foot, goose, gyro, hammer, hen,
home, hoof, horse, igloo, iron, jeep, jet, key, kite, leach,
leaf, lime, lion, lock, mail, menu, microphone, moon, moose,
mummy, nail, navy, nose, onion, owl, patty, phone, pill, pin,
piranha, puppy, ram, rat, razor-blade, rib, roach, safe, sauce,
saw, seal, shark, shoe, shoe, snake, snow, soap, sock, suit,
sumo, teacup, tepee, tiger, tire, toad, toe, vase, waffle, wagon,
wiener
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